As the U.S. begins negotiations with Iran over their nuclear program there needs to be an honest assessment of how important a nuclear weapon is to Iran. Iran’s nuclear efforts, whether civilian or military, have to be viewed in context. Why Iran wants nuclear energy for civilian use? There is a real argument that Iran’s primary goal is to pursue effective nuclear energy. Although Iran has the third largest oil reserves and the second largest gas reserves they lack a domestic refining ability which forces Iran to rely on imported gasoline.
A domestic nuclear energy capability would diversify their economy away from oil, establish energy independence, reduce Iran’s susceptibility to fluctuations in oil prices, and enhance a growth rate that while impressive, significantly trails their neighbors on the south side of the Persian Gulf. Further, nuclear energy would establish a national industry that would bolster Iran’s 12.5% (probably grossly understated) unemployment rate, a weak point for Ahmadinejad in the Presidential elections.
The state of Iran’s economy and their energy woes can be found in this very helpful CRS report . Why Iran may want to be secretive? So why be so secretive about civilian power? Why build plants for civilian use underground? Why not just allow in the IAEA and let them give the all clear in order to obtain more support for their nuclear program and relieve sanctions that are stagnating other parts of the economy? Well, for starters they do not trust the Western Powers or Israel not to attempt to strike their enrichment facilities. If there were ever to be a military operation against Iran power facilities would be a target of the highest priority. Past examples can be found in the Yugoslavia and Iraqi campaign. A 1991 Washington Post article by Barton Gellman describes the air campaign against the power infrastructure in the first Iraq War. “At least nine of the allied attacks targeted transformers or switching yards, each of which U.S. analysts estimated would take about a year to repair – with Western assistance. In some cases, however, the bombs targeted main generator halls, with an estimated five-year repair time.
The Harvard team, which visited most of Iraq’s 20 generating plants, said that 17 were damaged or destroyed in allied bombing. Of the 17, 11 were judged total losses. Now nearly four months after the war’s end, Iraq’s electrical generation has reached only 20 to 25 percent of its prewar capacity of 9,000 to 9,500 megawatts. Pentagon analysts calculate that the country has roughly the generating capacity it had in 1920 – before reliance on refrigeration and sewage treatment became widespread.”The reason you take out electricity is because modern societies depend on it so heavily and therefore modern militaries depend on it so heavily,” said an officer involved in planning the air campaign. “It’s a leveraged target set.” Is it unreasonable to believe that even if Iran had no intention of building a bomb they would still perceive cooperation with the West to undermine the purpose of the nuclear program?
If Iran honestly believes that as long as they have civilian nuclear power there will be some form of sanctions (which is very possible considering the most recent NIE said they stopped trying in 2003) what incentive is there to cooperate? All cooperation will do is deprive them of the ability acquire the know how to develop nuclear weapons, compromise the position and interworking of their national power infrastructure, and force the nation to rely on another state for energy.
How is relying on an outside state for enriched uranium (run by the same people who are currently sanctioning you) any better for economic autonomy and energy security than relying on an outside state for gas imports? Patrick Clawson’s House Testimony on Iran’s Vulnerability to Foreign Economic Pressure demonstrates just how pressing critical energy independence is for the Iranians: “Emblematic of the Islamic Republic’s deep-seated economic problems is its inability to guarantee its citizens a secure energy supply, despite massive expenditures.
Electricity outages have become everyday occurrences in Iranian cities, especially during the hot summers. Natural gas consumption, on which most Iranians depend for heating and cooking, continues to be highly subsidized with the result that consumption is booming, forcing Iran to import more gas than it exports even though Iran has the world’s second largest reserves. The government has difficulty paying for imports. When in 2008 Turkmenistan cut off supplies in the midst of one of the coldest spells of weather Iran had experienced in decades in order to pressure Tehran to pay higher prices, the Iranian government had to shut off gas supplies to at least 1.4 million people.”Iran would likely not see a 100% reliance on third party uranium enrichment as anything but forefiting their dependence on foreign gas for a dependence on foreign uranium.
Why Iran attempted to acquire nuclear weapons if civilian energy is the primary motivator? Iran has undoubtedly taken steps to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. So how can one argue that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are primarily civilian despite known attempts to proliferate? The answer could be that Iran is primarily interested in having the ability to produce a bomb. Having an ICBM capability and the ability to develop a reliable nuclear weapon in a relatively short amount of time does have deterrent value without expending resources that could be used to establishing an energy structure or one day being an exporter of civilian nuclear know how. It also provides Iran some deterrence value without compromising international standing.
Another consideration that cannot be understated is Iran’s ability to pose just enough of a threat to Israel so as to goad them into taking a position that will result in the world construing them as an antagonist. Few things would help vindicate Ahmadinejad domestically and galvanize the region more than an ineffective attack by Israel on a nuclear site that was later found to not have been used to develop nuclear weapons. I am not arguing that Iran isn’t interested in trying to build bombs. They are. What I am saying is that maybe instead of looking at Iran as a “country trying to build bombs who wouldn’t mind having access to more nuclear power” maybe we should be looking at it the other way around.
If the Obama administration comes to the table threatening continued sanctions and doesn’t have an attractive suite of incentives which will promote energy independence and economic security for Iran negotiations will die a slow and painful death.( By CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies ) For more information on this argument or other studies we invite you to visit the link: www.csis.org
HOW IRAN GOT THE BOMB: The Twisted Path To A Nuclear Weapon
The critical unknown in the Middle East equation is the likelihood of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues to insist that Iran is pursuing only the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; other countries in the region, and the United States, are not so sure. The International Atomic Energy Agencys inspections of Iranian facilities have proved inconclusive, perhaps because Iran is concealing some research installations. But part of the problem lies in understanding what is needed to make a nuclear weapon and whether Iran has the necessary ingredients. In this acute analysis, written in clear language for the intelligent layperson, the physicist Jeremy Bernstein traces the circuitous route by which Iran secured the expertise it needed to develop a nuclear capability. He then assesses the current status of Irans nuclear program and whether it appears to be aimed at peaceful use or weapons production. The time of decision, he concludes, is fast approaching. Here below we post the preview text. You can order the book at Amazon clicking the link below.
“Nuclear fission of the uranium nucleus was discovered in Germany late in 1938. It was an unexpected discovery since it revealed a new source of energy. Einstein noted that it was the only source of terrestrial energy that did not directly or indirectly come from the Sun. It was also clear that this energy had military implications. In February 1939 Niels Bohr published a brief letter in the Physical Review that changed all future considerations for making nuclear weapons. What Bohr showed was that the isotope Uranium-235 is “fissile.” This means that it can be split—fissioned—by neutrons of any energy. On the other hand, Uranium-238 is “fissionable.” This means that it takes a minimum of neutron energy to split the nucleus. Bohr was pleased with this result since it seemed to rule out the possibility of nuclear weapons. You cannot make a weapon out of Uranium-238 because not enough neutrons of high energy are produced in the fission process. This makes an explosive chain reaction impossible. The chain reaction dies out since there are not enough high-energy neutrons to propagate it. The lower-energy neutrons will not split the Uranium-238 nucleus. Also, Bohr knew that Uranium-235 was a very rare isotope. Less that 1 percent of it is found in natural uranium, most of the rest being Uranium-238. To build a weapon, you would have to separate out enough Uranium-235 to make an explosive chain reaction. Bohr knew that you cannot separate isotopes chemically. Both 235 and 238 have virtually the same chemistry, so you must use mechanical means that take advantage of the minuscule mass difference between the isotopes. To do this, he said, would require the resources of an entire country. He was wrong. It took the resources of three—the United States, Canada, and Great Britain…………